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Scene and Surface in the Cinema: 
Implications for Realism 
Joseph D. Anderson 
RÉSUMÉ 
Dans !organisation visuelle d'un film, on peut distin-
guer deux ensembles distincts d'informations, l'un 
relatif à l'événement diégétique en trois dimensions (la 
scène) et l'autre, à l'écran bidimensionnel sur lequel le 
film est projeté (la surface). L'auteur, en collaboration 
avec ses collègues du Digital Arts and Imaging Lab, a 
essayé de déterminer quelle information était perçue 
comme faisant partie de la scène et quelle autre était 
considérée comme faisant partie de la surface. S'ap-
puyant sur les travaux de James J. Gibson, il conclut en 
mettant en question l'application de la théorie du 
réalisme au cinéma. 
ABSTRACT 
The visual array of a motion picture contains two sepa-
rable sets of information, one for a three-dimensional 
diegetic event (scene) and another set of information 
which specifies the two-dimensional screen upon 
which the film is projected (surface). The author and 
his colleagues of the Digital Arts and Imaging Lab have 
attempted to sort out which information is seen as part 
of the scene and which as part of the surface. Based on 
the works of James J. Gibson, their conclusions ques-
tion the application of the theory of realism to films. 
That the motion picture embodies a perplexing duality has 
been apparent from the beginning. As early as 1916 the eminent 
psychologist Hugo Munsterberg ([1915] 1970, p. 19) puzzled 
[...] we know that we see a flat screen and that the 
object which we see has only two dimensions... Yet 
this is knowledge and not immediate impression. We 
have no right whatever to say that the scenes which we 
see on the screen appear to us as flat pictures. 
And somewhat later, another distinguished psychologist, Rudolf 
Arnheim (1966, p. 26), ruminated that "[...] film, like the the-
ater, provides a partial illusion [...]. It is always at one and the 
same time a flat picture post card and the scene of living 
action." This dual nature of the image remained an enigma that 
frustrated film scholars and resulted in their failure to achieve 
the desired clarity concerning either the nature of the image 
itself, or the relationship of the film viewer to the picture mov-
ing on the screen. 
A quarter-century later the perceptual psychologist J. J. 
Gibson (1966, p. 235) confronted the problem again and 
observed that "[t]here is a curious paradox about a picture. It is 
neither a pure display on the one hand nor a pure deception on 
the other. The stimulus conveys information for both what it is 
physically and what it stands for." This insight concerning what 
the information contained in the image array specifies led to a 
functional definition of the situation that turns out to be very 
useful to film scholars. Gibson proposed that pictures, including 
motion pictures (or "progressive pictures" as he would have it) 
contain information for both a scene and a surface. 
For a motion picture, "scene" would obviously refer to the 
three-dimensional world available to the characters in the fic-
tional narrative, what film scholars have usually called the 
diegetic world. On the other hand, "surface" would include 
scratches on the film, digital artifacts like aliasing and cubeing, 
those stylistic devices that tend to ride up on the surface (such 
as titles and credits, intertitles and subtitles) as well as wipes, 
dissolves, irises, and other such transitional devices that call 
attention to the two-dimensional surface of the screen. 
Similarly, two-dimensional graphic compositions are em-
ployed intentionally in many films. They are often ambiguous, 
sometimes being seen as abstract two-dimensional graphic com-
positions (surface) and at other times as part of the three-
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dimensional diegetic events (scene). For example, diagonal 
graphic patterns are employed by Sergueï Eisenstein in the early 
sequences of Battleship Potemkin (1925) where the sailors' quar-
ters are seen as a maze of crowded hammocks hanging below 
deck, and then again as a dynamic two-dimensional composi-
tion of criss-crossing lines on the screen. 
It is critical to realise that no visual array can be seen as both 
scene and surface simultaneously. As in the ambiguous figures of 
traditional perceptual psychology, the perceptions alternate. Just 
as the well-known rabbit-duck figure cannot be seen as a rabbit 
and as a duck at the same time, so too the motion picture (indeed 
any picture) cannot be seen as scene and as surface at the same 
time. I have argued elsewhere that when viewing a motion pic-
ture we are constantly in alternation between seeing the scene 
and seeing the surface, and that the perceptual alternation 
between scene and surface constitutes a framing of the motion 
picture viewing event, separating the experience of a motion pic-
ture from the experience of the real world, and serving as an 
intermittent reminder to the viewer that the scene in which he or 
she becomes involved is not the natural world but an image.1 
Once the distinction between scene and surface is recognised the 
enigma of realism begins to give up its secrets. No longer is the 
cliché that "no one is ever fooled into mistaking a motion picture 
for reality" a convincing refutation of motion picture realism. 
Though there have been other directions, such as the fantasy 
films of Georges Méliès, the heavily stylized films of Robert 
Wiene and the German expressionists or the overtly constructed 
films of the Soviet Formalists, the main thrust of fiction film has 
been in the direction of realism. Even Sergueï Eisenstein, cer-
tainly not an avowed realist, chose to shoot the deck scenes of 
The Battleship Potemkin on a real battleship and to employ type-
casting (rather than heavy make-up) to ensure the realism of 
both ship and characters. Potemkin endures as Eisensteins mas-
terpiece, and along with its striking examples of Soviet montage, 
is a high degree of realism. So it is not that filmmakers have 
always had an ideological commitment to realism per se, but 
that the films themselves have been more compelling to audi-
ences when they have exploited the power of realism. 
K\ 
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There have been two major advocates of filmic realism, 
André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer, who wrote respectively, 
What Is Cinema? (1971), and Theory of Film: The Redemption of 
Physical Reality (1960). Kracauer (p. 300) felt that somewhere 
along the way to our modern technologically dependent life we 
lost touch with the physical world. He went on to find in the 
motion picture a remedy: 
Film renders visible what we did not, or perhaps even 
could not, see before its advent. It effectively assists us 
in discovering the material world with its psychophysi-
cal correspondences. We literally redeem this world 
from its dormant state, its state of virtual nonexistence, 
by endeavoring to experience it through the camera. 
Bazin (1971, p. 14) advanced a similar view in discussing the 
differences between painting and film. He said: 
Only a photographic lens can give us the kind of image 
of the object that is capable of satisfying the deep need 
man has to substitute for it something more than a 
mere approximation, a kind of decal or transfer. The 
photographic image is the object itself, the object freed 
from the conditions of time and space that govern it. 
[...] for photography does not create eternity, as art 
does, it embalms time, rescuing it simply from its 
proper corruption. Viewed in this perspective, the cine-
ma is objectivity in time. The film is no longer content 
to preserve the object, enshrouded as it were in an 
instant, as the bodies of insects are preserved intact, out 
of the distant past, in amber. 
If we make allowance for the fact that Kracauer and Bazin 
were both educated in a literary tradition rather than a scientific 
one, we find that their view of the motion picture s capacity for 
realism is actually rather compatible with Gibson's (1986, 
p. 293) when he says, with only a little less dramatic flare, 
[...] the eye developed to register change and trans-
formation. The retinal image is seldom an arrested 
image in life. Accordingly, we ought to treat the 
motion picture as the basic form of depiction and the 
painting or photograph as a special form of it. What a 
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strange idea! It goes counter to all we have been told 
about optics. But it follows directly from ecological 
optics. Moviemakers are closer to life than picture 
makers. 
Now the information available to us from a motion picture is 
greatly reduced from that available in the natural world, and as 
viewers we are constrained by the viewing situation. We cannot 
walk around and look at the event (at least not in ways other 
than those pre-selected for us by the filmmakers) or hear it from 
a different location. Nor can we taste, touch or smell the event 
being depicted. Yet there is still a great deal of information avail-
able to us, and an amazing aspect of motion picture viewing is 
that we seem to resonate to the information that is available, 
and never miss any information that might have been there but 
is not—unless some gap in information is called to our atten-
tion. 
Most peculiarly much of the work on film perception over 
the last thirty years has gone towards explaining presumed 
gaps, the assumptions being first, that viewers are affected by 
the gaps, and second, that the mind must somehow fill in all 
gaps in information. The point to be made here is that the fact 
that motion pictures present only preselected information, and 
that the information is partial in several dimensions, does not 
seem to undermine a film's realism from the viewer's point of 
view. 
The viewer's sense of realism is indeed so robust that my col-
leagues at the Digital Arts and Imaging Lab at Georgia State 
University and I set out to determine as systematically as possible 
what sorts of things might undermine that sense of reality. We 
assumed that it would be too easy to get viewers to note crude 
obvious problems that might detract from a film's realism, so we 
thought we would begin our study with the best digital effects 
that we could find, and we thought we should be able to find 
such effects in top-grossing Hollywood movies. So we selected 
clips from such films as Mission Impossible (De Palma, 1996), 
Twister (dD Bont, 1996), Titanic (Cameron, 1997), Apollo 13 
(Howard, 1995), and Forrest Gump (Zemeckis, 1994). The clips 
were each about two to three minutes long and arranged in 
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groups of five. We showed versions of these clips to groups of 
students, about twenty-five at a time. We told them that we had 
been asked to rate the clips on how real they looked, and that 
they should rate the scenes in an ongoing continuous way by 
twisting the dial on the responder unit that we had given each of 
them. We were able to see their responses in real time, individu-
ally and as a group, and to record this information for later 
analysis. We conducted group discussions after the trials to see 
what reasons they gave for their responses. 
One of the manipulations was to introduce surface clutter 
into the image. The clutter was considerable, and of course in 
the video presentation these surface artifacts were in motion. 
The question of interest is whether viewers actually distinguish 
between surface and scene. Specifically, would viewers rate a clip 
with a high degree of surface clutter as less realistic than other 
clips without clutter in the same presentation or the same clip 
without clutter in another presentation? And the answer, per-
haps startling to some, is that they did not. The implication we 
draw is that viewers do indeed distinguish between surface and 
scene, and that surface information is generally ignored when 
judging the credibility of the scene itself. In this situation and in 
most viewing situations the scene contains much more informa-
tion than the surface; the scene contains information which 
specifies events and affordances and thereby demands the 
greater attention.2 
Another question is what kind of information in the scene 
itself is most likely to undermine its realism. We found rather 
consistent drops in viewer judgments of realism at certain 
moments in the clips: 1) when Tom Cruise climbs on the heli-
copter or is hurled through the air in Mission Impossible-, 
2) when the bodies are tossed about on the deck of the Titanic, 
and 3) when the characters in Twister struggle through flying 
debris. The experimenters were, of course, watching the com-
puter monitor and were able to observe the points where view-
ers suddenly shifted their evaluations of realism downward. In 
order to find out what the viewers themselves thought they were 
responding to, we asked them in the follow-up session. And we 
got answers such as: Tom Cruise and the helicopter didn't seem 
66 CiNeMAS, vol. 12, n° 2 
to "tug on each other" enough; the people on the Titanic didn't 
seem to "change their shapes appropriately" when they are tossed 
about the deck; and the man and woman in Twister didn't seem 
to be "hit by any of that stuff that was flying around." 
The reports of the viewers were not inconsistent with the 
judgments of the experimenters. That is, the experimenters 
noted that precipitous declines in the graphs they were watching 
coincided with the effects of forces, wind, gravity, centrifugal, on 
bodies. The experimenters reported that viewers responded 
immediately and decisively to what they termed "small violations 
of the laws of physics." It would seem that the kinds of optical 
information to which our viewers responded most dramatically 
might be described as those which specify something amiss in 
ecologically relevant events—that is, those that indicate a prob-
lem with the ways in which objects or forces interact, a problem 
with ecological dynamics (Gibson, 1986, p. 182). These events 
can be described in terms of what Gibson has called "distur-
bances in the local structure of the optic array," most of them in 
the case of our study falling under the general category of defor-
mation. Such disturbances, as Gibson (1986, p. 110) so elo-
quently puts it, "[...] are what we are visually most sensitive to, 
all of us, animals, babies, men, women, and moviegoers." 
But now we have crossed over and are talking about the rela-
tionship of the viewer to the image. Bazin and Kracauer were on 
pretty solid ground in talking about the image's relationship to 
reality because they could rely on the process of photography, 
but they were more speculative when specifying the spectator's 
relationship to the image. They knew that to explain the specta-
tor's relationship to the image they must in some way rely upon 
a theory of mind. Bazin drew upon phenomenology, and 
though Kracauer's theory was not explicitly phenomenological, 
he too addressed the experience of the individual spectator, 
claiming, like Bazin, that the cinematic image could present 
physical reality afresh, that it could, to use Bazin's phenomeno-
logical language, awaken in the spectator a sense of "being-in-
the-world." But experientially based approaches like phenome-
nology as a theory of mind are often limited at best and at worst 
misleading. 
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It is in this regard that Gibson's overarching ecological ap-
proach, which encompasses his insight regarding scene and sur-
face, proves particularly useful. Ecological theory, like the theory 
of Bazin and Kracauer, takes into account the individuals expe-
rience, but Gibson is careful to ground his approach firmly in 
biology, reminding us at every turn that we as individuals always 
function as members of a larger species and within our particu-
lar ecological niche. We do not perceive all things, or take in all 
the available information. Or as evolutionary psychologist 
Henry Plotkin (1998, p. 193) has put it, 
[...] regular and reliable learning must indicate the 
presence of constraint because the search space is so 
large that unconstrained learning alone is extremely 
unlikely to succeed in finding the right things to learn 
in the short time available to the conscious experience 
of a newborn child. [...] The search space must be nar-
rowed by something that aims the learning into a rela-
tively tiny corner of all possible search space. 
Traditional perceptual psychology assumes that perception 
begins with sensations and from those sensations the brain con-
structs a perception. Gibson came to question those assump-
tions and to realise that it was not a matter of construction that 
the human perceptual system was designed not to perceive sen-
sations but to pick up information from the ambient array of 
light. The ecological approach to visual perception emphasises 
the information contained in the changing patterns of light 
available to the eye (or as Gibson called it, the ambient optic 
array). The changes in the optic array contain invariant proper-
ties that persist through changes in illumination and point of 
view, and these "invariants" specify objects or events in the 
world, which in turn inform action on the part of the viewer. In 
this ecological approach perception and action are "[...] tightly 
interlocked and mutually constraining" (Bruce and Green, 
1990, p. 224). The opportunity afforded for action is contained 
in the act of perceiving. It is a perceived opportunity for present 
or future action which Gibson calls an "affordance." 
Let us consider the distinction between scene and surface in 
this context. In the perception of surface, whatever affordance 
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there might be is clearly for the viewer, since the information is 
available only to members of the audience and never to the 
film's characters. And then there are affordances that are avail-
able only to the characters—food to eat, water to drink—and 
these are clearly part of the scene. But what about those scenes 
that are available to both character and viewer? One such scene 
is the filmic spectacle—a sunset, a sexually titillating shot. Such 
scenes may be for the viewer alone; there may be no character in 
a position to witness the scene. Or the spectacle may be avail-
able to both viewer and character(s). The spectacular sunset, for 
instance, affords an aesthetic experience for both the film viewer 
and the fictional characters who witness it. Yet other scenic 
events hold affordances only for the film viewer—for example, a 
shot in which the monster lunges toward the camera, looming 
on the screen. These are sometimes called "startle shots," and it 
is the viewer who is startled. 
Furthermore, the target of the affordances can shift within a 
shot or from one shot to the next. Consider, for example, a 
scene from Witness (Weir, 1985). The Amish widow Rachel 
Lapp (Kelly McGillis) leaves the kitchen, observed through the 
window from the backyard by John Book (Harrison Ford). The 
next several shots are of Rachel bathing. The scene appears to be 
an omniscient sequence of shots intended to be a spectacle 
designed for the pleasure of the film viewer alone until Books 
presence in the doorway is revealed by his reflection in a mirror. 
The affordance that was previously for the viewer alone has 
become an affordance for both viewer and characters. But 
unlike the viewer, the characters are afforded not just spectacle 
but the opportunity for action. The characters' eyes meet (indi-
cating a mutual affordance) and Rachel turns around, framed in 
the doorway, implicitly offering herself to Book, who hesitates, 
but soon makes the decision not to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity presented to him. This carries the scene to the level of 
narrative significance, providing a critical turning point in the 
subplot involving the mutual attraction of these two characters 
in the film. 
The viewer's relationship with the diegetic world is further 
explained in this context. While we have sometimes toyed with 
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the idea of the viewer entering the diegetic space, as though part 
of the fictional world, the concept has never seemed quite right. 
As viewers we knew we were not part of the fictional world, 
could not act upon that world or interact with it. The distinc-
tion made here between surface and scene, between affordances 
for the viewer and for the characters, makes it far more plausible 
that the viewer never enters the diegetic space, but that the spec-
tacles on the screen sometimes invade the viewer's space, causing 
reactions that in retrospect might seem an odd response to an 
image, as we duck when an object is hurled at us from the 
screen, or lift our feet from the movie theatre's floor at the sight 
of a pit full of rattlesnakes, or recoil when the monster looms at 
us from the screen. 
Let's pause at this point to note that the transition into talk-
ing about the individual perceiver is fraught with danger. There 
is great danger of losing one's footing on the slippery slopes of 
subjective experience, internal constructions and ultimately 
solipsism. Much film phenomenology ends up here. Gibson was 
aware of the need to address the individual perceiver's situa-
tion—his or her needs and (yes) desires, and he did so with the 
concept of affordances. But that does not mean that the ecologi-
cal approach need therefore opens the door to relativism and 
solipsism. He was most careful to avoid these pitfalls, and 
warned of the "[...] danger of falling into the ridiculous pit of 
solipsism" (Gibson, 1982, p. 382), of "[...] concluding that we 
can know nothing but our perceptions. [...] Once having made 
this argument," he writes, "a theorist is trapped in a circle of 
subjectivism and is diverted into futile speculations about pri-
vate worlds" (Gibson, 1959, p. 462-463). 
It may be true that in terms of attention, there are moments 
during a movie when the viewer is so involved in the fictional 
events as to lose the sense of being in the theatre and attend 
only to the events of the diegetic world. The more compelling 
the diegetic events the longer the viewer will remain in that state 
before he or she regains the awareness of viewership. The push-
pull in and out of the diegesis, and the alternation of awareness 
of scene and surface are dynamic, rhythmic patterns in film 
viewing. 
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Because motion pictures have existed for a mere 100 years— 
not even a drop in the bucket of evolutionary time—we necessar-
ily bring to the activity of film spectatorship capacities and strate-
gies developed in another time for another purpose. Designed to 
extract veridical information from the ambient array of light in 
the natural world—that is, information that was accurate enough 
to act upon, our capacities are constrained by their evolutionary 
development; they are, as Henry Plotkin might put it, aimed into 
a tiny part of the possible search space. It is that search space that 
Gibson has identified as the ecological niche appropriate to 
human perception. 
These are the capacities that we bring to the visual array 
regardless of the process by which the visual array was generat-
ed. And if these capacities were developed through evolution to 
enable us to extract accurate information, we will when pre-
sented with the visual array that is a motion picture extract 
information from it in the same way we do from the natural 
world. If that is the case, if the patterns of light reflected from a 
movie screen are processed by the visual system as though they 
were reflected directly from the surfaces of physical reality, then 
a theory of realism is clearly called for. If the film viewer inter-
acts with patterns of light on the screen as he or she does with 
patterns of light in the world, then the relationship between 
the natural world and the image on the screen is not an 
insignificant matter; nor is an understanding of how the viewer 
interacts with the natural world (and by extension the film 
image) something that can be considered optional in a theory 
of film. 
But a viewer perceives the depicted world, the "scene," as well 
as the physical display of flickering two-dimensional patterns of 
light on a beaded screen and the visual elements that are not 
available to the characters in the fictional world such as the 
titles, effects, wipes and dissolves. The latter might legitimately 
be included as part of "surface." But there is information other 
than surface information that should be considered in this con-
text. There are elements such as inept make-up, poorly written 
dialogue, or bad acting, which, like surface elements, provide 
information for what the motion picture is rather than what it 
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depicts. This is the central paradox of the motion picture, and it 
constrains and defines the experience of film viewing: The 
information available from the screen is both for a highly articu-
lated fictional world and for the thing itself, the construction 
that constitutes a motion picture. 
One may be able to dispense with the screen and minimize 
other information for surface as with virtual reality, and be left 
with a scene that is almost indistinguishable from reality. Yet 
this medium too contains information for both what it is and 
what it depicts, and this information also serves as a continual 
reminder to the viewer that he is viewing a constructed image. 
For any human construction the telltale marks of its crafting 
can be minimised but never completely expunged. This holds 
true for all forms of images, yet to the extent that any optic 
array before us fails to contain information that it has been 
scripted, casted, costumed, choreographed, acted, photo-
graphed, composited, projected, displayed, drawn, painted, 
carved or generated on a computer, the scene appears real. 
University of Central Arkansas 
NOTES 
1. See The Reality of Illusion: An Ecological Approach to Cognitive Film Theory 
(Anderson, 1996, p. 43-49). 
2. In his book, Sense of Order, E. H. Gombrich (1984) has provided compelling 
arguments that even when looking at non-representational decorative patterns we are 
drawn to the areas of highest information in a similar way. 
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